

## EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

This is a double issue of the Quarterly Review covering the first half of 2022. While the previous issue was due in April, Russia's invasion of Ukraine disrupted our usual production cycle. We needed some time to reflect on the tragic developments and humanitarian crisis unfolding in our region since 24 February.

As usual, this Quarterly Review provides a snapshot of the most recent Prague Process activities. The second preparatory Senior Officials' Meeting for the fourth Ministerial Conference, taking place in Prague on 24-25 October 2022, represented the first face-to-face meeting of the Prague Process since more than two years of pandemic. Shortly afterwards, the Study Visit to Malta gathered representatives of a dozen participating countries in the most Southern Prague Process state, providing for an overly rich and productive programme. In addition, three online events assessed the priority migration issues across our

region, addressing the emergency situation arising from the war in Ukraine and providing an outlook into the future. We have intentionally abstained from describing these activities in great detail, instead inviting you to visit the [Prague Process website](#), which entails additional information and video recordings of all our online events.

Naturally, a large part of this issue is devoted to the unprecedented mass displacement from Ukraine, highlighting the situation of children fleeing the war and trafficking risks in situations of forced displacements. In addition, this Quarterly Review assesses some other migration implications of the war, which have received less attention in Europe. Lastly, this issue provides various reading recommendations, including the latest research carried out within the Prague Process Migration Observatory.

We wish you an interesting read, a relaxing summer and hope that peace prevails.

## In this issue:

- Editorial
- Upcoming Prague Process activities
- Online Events held in the first half of 2022
- Senior Officials' Meeting
- Study visit to Malta
- Impressions from the World Border Security Congress 2022
- The impact of the war on migration and migrants across the Prague Process region
- Trafficking concerns amid the war in Ukraine: Interview with Melita Gruevska Graham, Head of ICMPD's Anti-Trafficking Programme
- Spotlight on children fleeing the war in Ukraine: the need for due registration
- "You Cannot Replace a Person": An MPF Project Gives Voice to Children Staying Behind in Moldova and Ukraine
- Newly released publications of the Prague Process Migration Observatory
- Reading recommendations

## Looking ahead: upcoming Prague Process activities 2022

- 29 Aug - 2 Sep 2<sup>nd</sup> National Simulation Training against Human Trafficking in Kyrgyzstan (organised by OSCE, in cooperation with the Prague Process)
- 4 - 10 Sep International Summer School on Migration, Azerbaijan (supported by the Prague Process)
- 24 Oct Senior Officials' Meeting, Prague, Czech Republic
- 24-25 Oct **4<sup>th</sup> Prague Process Ministerial Conference, Prague, Czech Republic**

## Prague Process Online Events

In January, two Policy Talks aimed to set the stage for 2022. The first one **'Learning from 2021: What migration dynamics and policy developments to expect in 2022?'** brought together Mr Jean-Louis De Brouwer, Director of the European Affairs Program, Egmont Institute, and Mr Ralph Genetzke, Director, ICMPD Brussels Mission, both of whom had already met in this setting a year earlier. Looking back at the key migration events of 2021, they discussed the prospects for 2022.



The second Policy Talk **'Labour Mobility in the EU & Beyond: Introducing the European Labour Authority'** with Ms Slavka Eley, Head of Governance and Coordination, European Labour Authority, and Mr Martin Hofmann, ICMPD Principal Advisor, looked at the role and mandate of the European Labour Authority. It also addressed broader trends in European labour markets, and the implications for labour mobility within the EU and beyond.



The Panel discussion **'The War in Ukraine and its Implications for Migration in the Prague Process Region'** assessed the first two months of the war from a migration perspective. The eight panellists discussed the EU's immediate response, the current situation on the ground, as well as the wider migration implications across the Prague Process region and possible post-war migration scenarios.

The video recordings of all online events are available on [the website](#).



## The second Preparatory Senior Officials' Meeting took place in Vienna

On 12-13 May 2022, Austria hosted the second preparatory Senior Officials' Meeting for the upcoming Ministerial Conference. The event gathered 80 officials from 26 countries, as well as relevant EU institutions and international organisations. Participants had an opportunity to comment on the updated

drafts of the Ministerial Declaration and the Action Plan, which reflected earlier discussions, while also referring to the most pressing regional challenges. One session was devoted to the migration impacts of the Russian war in Ukraine across the region, focusing in particular on participating states' responses

to the unprecedented forced displacement resulting from it. The second day focused on examples and possible new areas for practical cooperation within the Prague Process. The Czech EU Presidency will host the fourth Prague Process Ministerial Conference in Prague on 24-25 October 2022.



## Prague Process Study visit to Malta

Upon the invitation of the Maltese Ministry for Home Affairs, Security, Reforms and Equality and the Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs and Trade, a Study Visit to Malta took place on 7-9 June. Its main aim was to acquaint participants with the migration-related work of the Maltese authorities, introducing relevant migration policy aspects and operational practices applied in the daily work. Participants also visited the European Union Agency for Asylum, which introduced its newly enhanced mandate and the cooperation envisaged with the Prague Process. Finally, participants had an opportunity to visit the Training Institute on Migration Capacity Partnership and ICMPD's Regional Office for the Mediterranean whose accumulated experience provided various inspiration. Read more [here](#).



## Impressions from the World Border Security Congress 2022

On 17-19 May, the Prague Process Secretariat attended the [World Border Security Congress](#) in Lisbon, which brought together over 400 representatives of 67 countries from across the globe, as well as organizations such as OSCE, AU-ECOSOCC, IOM, EAASP, ICMPD and MARRI.

As underlined by Ms Patricia Gaspar, Secretary of State for Home Affairs of Portugal, migration is a positive and natural phenomenon, but its benefits can only be ensured through safe and secure borders. Border management is complex as it combines policies, processes and systems delivered by both public and private organizations. By staying up to date with technological innovations and remaining adaptable, governments and agencies have better chances to prevent and tackle the global challenges that we see emerging nowadays.

The Congress featured numerous renowned speakers who addressed manifold thematic areas, including organized crime, trafficking and smuggling, drugs and weapons, information

sharing and inter-agency collaboration in the digital age, countering terrorism and cross-border crime, combating cultural heritage and wildlife trafficking, travel document security and ID fraud, maritime challenges, humanitarian border management as well as future migration and trafficking challenges. The closed agency and technology workshops were especially appreciated as they provided more targeted discussions.

The Congress's Exhibition gathered leading companies from around the world to display the newest technological solutions for better and more secure borders. It thus facilitated the direct contact and networking between government officials and the private sector.

The latest Border Security Report (May/June 2022) is available [here](#).





## The impact of the war in Ukraine on migration and migrants across the Prague Process region

For many years, the Prague Process region has featured substantial labour migration flows from the Eastern Partnership countries to the EU and Russia as well as from Central Asia to Russia. In 2021, nearly 8 million migrants from Central Asia alone - primarily from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan - arrived to Russia for work. As of 8 March 2022, Russia became the **most sanctioned country** in the world outrunning Iran, Syria and North Korea. While capital controls and the high prices of energy and raw materials have so far helped the Russian economy to withstand the imposed sanctions, an **economic recession may** lie ahead, which will have consequences for regional migrants and their countries of origin. The **western economies** will also face a period of slow or negative growth, rising inflation and unemployment with aftereffects for dependent economies.

### Impact on remittances: anticipated slump

The countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus are highly dependent on remittances. In 2021, the share of remittances in the GDP of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Armenia constituted **34%, 33%, 14%, 13% and 11%** respectively. Meanwhile, the share of remittances received from Russia was 82% in Kyrgyzstan and over 50% in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The economic recession in Russia will ultimately drag down the **economies** of these states, especially **Tajikistan** and Kyrgyzstan, manifested through rising currency **devaluation**, inflation, unemployment and poverty. The most recent World Bank assessment specifies that remittances from Russia may decline by as much as **40% in 2022**. Consequently,

the money transfers to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Armenia will decline anywhere between **one third to a quarter**. This loss will result from the expected weakening of the rouble against the US dollar and from the significantly reduced economic activity in Russia, which would dampen the employment and incomes of migrant workers. The exclusion of Russia from the SWIFT network will force migrants to use informal channels for money transfers and limit possibilities to ensure transfers into Russia, affecting both the Russian population and migrants residing in the country. Internal capital controls by Russia may further reduce the options for money transfers.

### Impact on labour migration and migrant employment

Most migrants in Russia work in the construction, agriculture and transport sectors, as well as in services. Since 24 February, hundreds of foreign enterprises have closed their businesses in Russia. The **construction sector** has reported a certain slowdown due to the disruption of existing supply chains. According to **IOM**, up to two million jobs may be lost, with unemployment expected to rise up to 7.8%. The outlook for migrant workers might thus

be grim, but the process will be time-spaced. According to a **survey** conducted at the end of March, some 6% of labour migrants reported losing jobs, and another 5.5% faced salary reductions. Some regional labour migrants opted out of **planned trips** to Russia. As many as **60.000 Tajik and 133.000 Uzbek citizens** have returned home from Russia in the first quarter of 2022. However, **most labour migrants** remain in the country and 30% plan to stay for prolonged periods. Moreover, a growing share of labour migrants (**93% in 2022 vs 70%** in previous years) possess documents for legal employment. As of 1 May, close to 6 million foreigners, of whom over **3 million labour migrants**, were present in Russia. The flow of labour migrants in the first quarter of 2022 was four times higher than in 2021. Nevertheless, structural changes are very visible: **83%** of labour migrants come from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, the share of labour migrants from Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia has declined by two to five times, compared to 2019.

### Alternative destinations

Overall, a full-fledged reorientation of migration flows from Russia to other destinations is hardly possible in the short run. Existing bilateral labour agreements between main sending countries and alternative destinations



operate with much smaller volumes and further diversification is a matter of time. While Kazakhstan may potentially become the prime choice for labour migrants from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, it remains difficult to assess how many will ultimately come. The economy of Kazakhstan is heavily interdependent with the one of Russia. Following the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014, Kazakhstan's economy **contracted for several years** and the number of incoming labour migrants dropped considerably. The likelihood of a similar scenario is high. Turkey may find itself in a similar situation as it already hosts seasonal migrants from Azerbaijan, Georgia and the countries of Central Asia. Most of these migrants work in the agriculture, construction, entertainment and tourism sectors. Yet, the war in Ukraine will heavily affect the Turkish economy. The value of the Turkish lira has already **lost 20%** since the beginning of 2022. Moreover, **Turkish regions** that usually attracted millions of Ukrainian and Russian tourists will make less in revenue, which may influence migrant employment outcomes. South Korea and the Gulf countries, such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, will also attract labour migrants from the region, including through existing bilateral agreements, but their number may not be significant. The Member States of the EU and Poland in particular may not be in a position to receive large numbers of labour migrants from Georgia, Moldova or Armenia, given the mass inflow of Ukrainians, entitled to work under the Temporary Protection Directive.

## Emigration of Russians

Amid economic sanctions and internal restrictions imposed on key constitutional rights – freedom of speech, assembly and movement – many Russians rushed out of the country. Political activists, journalists, academics and artists are leaving in fear of political persecution. **IT specialists**, who are less bound by a physical workplace, depart in **considerable numbers** anticipating the recession. The first wave of the so-called 'relocation' also includes those who are concerned about the possible conscription into the army and those who do not believe that the situation inside the country will improve any time soon.

Assumingly, **several hundred thousand** Russian citizens have left the country by the end of March with the exact number hard to establish. According to Russia's Border Service, close to **4 million** Russians crossed the border in the first quarter of 2022. While this figure exceeds the flow of 2021, it represents only **half of the flow** recorded in 2019 and 2020 and says little about real emigration. In addition, the recent analysis of Russian mobile operators concluded that **80% of 'sim-cards'** that left Russia since the outbreak of the war had returned by now.

The EU-wide ban on air traffic with Russia along with the strict visa regulations (some EU countries suspended the issuance of Schengen visas to Russian citizens) pre-determined

the choice of destinations among the Russian emigres who opted for visa-free and considerably affordable countries such as Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. In March, some **50.000 to 100.000** Russian nationals arrived in Armenia. In Georgia, their number exceeded **90.000** in March and April, 56.000 of whom left again. Kazakhstan recorded a **four-fold** increase in individual tax numbers - among others, needed for opening a bank account - issued to Russians in March. However, the **in- and outflows** have not yet reached pre-pandemic levels. More than **70.000** Russians registered in Kyrgyzstan from January until mid-May, representing a 7% increase as compared to 2021. Meanwhile, Turkey has issued more than **93.000** number residence permits (mostly short-term) to Russian nationals in 2022, outnumbering the **2021 figure by 26.000**. Turkey operates a 'golden visa' programme, granting **residence permits and citizenship against investment**, which **reportedly** was high in demand among those Russians arriving to Turkey since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Other popular destinations include **visa-free Israel** – a choice among persons of Jewish descent, and **the UAE** – mostly targeted by entrepreneurs and those able to invest in property. Up to **15.000 Russian millionaires** may leave Russia in 2022, the majority of whom will go to Israel and the UEA.

---

## Trafficking concerns amid the war in Ukraine: Interview with Melita Gruevska Graham, Head of ICMPD's Anti-Trafficking Programme

The war in Ukraine forced millions of Ukrainian and third-country nationals to leave for other countries in search of safety. The scale and speed of displacement are the perfect ground for trafficking cases to multiply. We talked with Ms Melita Gruevska Graham, Head of ICMPD's Anti-Trafficking Programme, about the risks of trafficking created by the unfolding conflict and the critical steps to stem potential trafficking cases.

*Dear Melita, ICMPD has been conducting empirical research on the phenomenon of human trafficking in dynamic mixed migration contexts and humanitarian crises since 2014. While some of the vulnerabilities and trafficking cases analysed in these studies are specific to the contexts of the Syrian crises and the migration crises in 2015, are there any findings and recommendations relevant to the current conflict in Ukraine?*

Indeed, some of the research findings are relevant to other war and refugee situations, including the current conflict in Ukraine. More importantly, a positive policy development at the EU level that was introduced shortly after the start of the Ukrainian war is one of the main recommendations of the research conducted by ICMPD. Namely, to respond to the situation of displacement of millions of people, the European Commission proposed and the EU



Member States agreed to activate the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD). This is exactly what ICMPD emphasised in the recommendations of the Studies - the need for safe and legal pathways. A key driver of resilience to almost all forms of trafficking and other abuses, is the possibility to travel regularly and the potential for legal status, employment and integration in the hosting countries. The activation of the TPD is an important step forward as it provides legal pathways toward safety. This is an essential step to improve the resilience of the people to exploitation, trafficking and abuse.

*Lessons learned from the previous humanitarian crises and the monitoring of the current crisis as well as the humanitarian response provided over the past months already indicate serious concerns related to exploitation and abuse, including the incidence of trafficking in human beings. What are the immediate risks and vulnerabilities to trafficking in human beings?*

Although the activation of the TPD is expected to prevent many of the risks and vulnerabilities to exploitation, the magnitude of the displacement is expected to affect the people in Ukraine and those fleeing the war in several ways. I would like to mention a few. Firstly, the past months saw many people from the neighbouring countries and other EU member states offering transportation from the border and private accommodation. As much as such efforts are part of society's response to the fast-developing crisis, these could have dangerous results, when happening in a non-coordinated manner. While emergency assistance is a priority, the front-line responders must be aware that the displaced people represent an easy target for "opportunistic" traffickers or organised criminal groups who seek to make a profit from those in hopeless situations. Secondly, there is a big number of unaccompanied children crossing the borders of Ukraine. Children aged under 18 travelling without their parents or guardians are particularly vulnerable and at risk. Failing to identify and support these children exposes them to the severe danger of being groomed and abused by traffickers and other criminals. Special attention should be paid to children travelling with someone who fraudulently claims to be a family member as these children are more vulnerable to abuse. Lastly, non-Ukrainian people legally residing in Ukraine with temporary permits have greater difficulties in terms of access to a legal status because they do not fall under the scope of the TPD. These people could easily be seen as irregularly residing in the EU. Such status could

push many of them to the irregular labour market and exploitative practices.

*What are the most urgent steps that need to be taken to prevent trafficking and to timely identify potential victims of trafficking?*

To maintain people's resilience to trafficking deriving from the activation of the TPD, the states need to ensure registration and granting of temporary protection to as many people fleeing the war as possible. Those that are not registered are left without access to protection, more importantly to health support and the labour market. Such a legal status vacuum presents a serious vulnerability and high risk for illegal employment and labour exploitation. In parallel, there is a need to incorporate the screening and identification of vulnerabilities, and potential trafficking cases, into the reception and registration process, by providing specialist training and tools for identification to first-line responders and putting procedures in place for a referral. Regarding the protection of children, establishing strict and clear rules for care and referral of unaccompanied children arriving at the reception centres or in other locations is of utmost importance. These efforts should be followed by a proper monitoring system to ensure that these children will receive a legal guardian, immediate access to education and enter into the national protection and care system. To prevent children from going missing, there is a need to establish and implement effective cooperation procedures between countries to identify, trace and reunite unaccompanied and separated children with their family members.

## Spotlight on children fleeing the war in Ukraine: the need for due registration

Since the Russia's invasion, over **two million children** have been forced to flee Ukraine, of whom over **200.000** might have been presumably deported to Russia. Another three million have been internally displaced within Ukraine. Even though the majority of children are accompanied, the current flow also consists of unaccompanied minors and children from institutions.

As a rule, children on the move represent one of the most vulnerable groups requiring sustained and urgent care and protection. In the war context and against the speed of the ongoing displacement, the risk of neglect, disappearances and trafficking of children, as well as separation of children and families with further risk of institutionalisation and illegal adoption are even

higher. However, even accompanied minors cannot be presumed safe from trafficking, violence or exploitation, unless adults travelling with them are appropriately screened.

Many of these risks result directly from the lack of due registration, including collection of biometric data, of all children crossing the border. The



visa-free travel from Ukraine to the EU along with the activation of the EU Temporary Protection Directive result in people falling outside the scope of existing data systems. At present, registration is undertaken either at the border of neighbouring non-EU states or directly in the EU country of destination. Should national registration systems fail to register a child at first entry, it may become invisible. Equally, those children who cross from Ukraine directly into one of the EU bordering states – Poland, Romania, Slovakia or Hungary – risk bypassing the registration system. Consequently, these children cannot be traced for protection purposes and screened for vulnerabilities or potential trafficking cases. Moreover, the lack of early, frequent, child-friendly and age-appropriate information and communication in their own language during the registration process may undermine engagement with authorities, which represents an important element for the prevention of both disappearance and trafficking. The [NGO Magnolia](#), Ukrainian partner to Missing Children Europe, has already recorded over 2.100 cases of missing children and several cases of prevented trafficking of refugee children from Ukraine.

The complex system of registration with differing national approaches and a diversity of stakeholders also renders identification and responses to cross-border cases of children going missing overly difficult. The promising new functionalities of the Schengen Information System that will allow setting preventive alerts to protect certain

categories of vulnerable persons are still under development. However, police in Ukraine do not have access to the system.

Children from residential care institutions represent a specific case. The lack of a centralized cross-country information management system to keep track of the whereabouts, safety and well-being of these children complicates their relocation. This group of children also requires special care in finding accommodation that will not hamper established important social relationships with caregivers and other children from

these institutions, to prevent further uncertainty and trauma. The Ukrainian government expressed additional concern for the children residing on uncontrolled territory and Russia's plans to simplify the adoption regulation for Ukrainian children.

Given that [28%](#) of identified victims of trafficking globally are children, there are reasons to believe that such large-scale displacement of children may lead to a significant spike in human trafficking and an acute child protection crisis.

Read more [here](#) and [here](#)



## “You Cannot Replace a Person”: An MPF Project Gives Voice to Children Staying Behind in Moldova and Ukraine

Over the past decades, there has been a significant and sizable flow of economic migrants from Eastern Europe to the European Union, seeking better employment opportunities and higher living standards. Many of them are parents who have left their children behind, which has given rise to ‘transnational families’ defined as familial groups wherein members live partially or fully in separation but foster a sense

of familyhood, interdependence and collective welfare across borders.

Transnational families are a stark reality in Moldova and Ukraine. In Moldova, 150.000 children have at least one parent living abroad, while 35.000 children have both parents abroad. In Ukraine, 200.000 children are left behind by at least one parent, which concerns up to 25% of all children in certain regions.

In 2021, the **‘Children Left Behind by Labour Migration: Supporting Moldovan and Ukrainian Transnational Families in the EU’ (CASTLE)** project was launched to explore the situation of transnational families and children staying behind. The project is funded by the European Union through the Migration Partnership Facility (MPF) of ICMPD. It is implemented by Babes-Bolyai University in

collaboration with Terre des Hommes Romania, Ukraine and Moldova, the Ukrainian Institute for Social Research Oleksander Yaremenko and the Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova. The project adopts a participatory approach in which the children, as well as adults, are actively engaged as co-researchers.

The research conducted entails interviews with 'children staying behind' in Moldova and Ukraine, giving them a voice in describing their experiences and views on their parents' migration and the transnational nature of their families.

### **Different Understanding of the Reasons for Leaving**

The findings show that left-behind children view leaving and staying in a more nuanced, open and fluid manner than parents, valuing emotional resources and well-being over better economic prospects in a very profound way. For instance, one Ukrainian child was perplexed by the apparent non-necessity of migration for more affluent families, not understanding that migration is one of the few options for economic survival in their case. In this manner, the research uncovered that children formulate their own narratives about separation that can have adverse consequences stemming from the emotional ordeal of being 'left behind' if they cannot reconcile their own emotional needs with the necessity for parents to leave for better economic opportunities.

### **Transnational Communication - Frequency and Functionality**

The ability to communicate instantaneously has enabled a high degree of co-presence and a higher level of intimacy within transnational families, allowing them to renegotiate their relationships and make timely decisions given the closer involvement. In a few cases, transnational families struggled to establish emotional intimacy and manage relationships from afar, with non-communication as the topic of contention. In one case in Moldova, the caregiver forbade direct communication with the migrant parent, and in another case (also in Moldova), online

communication degenerated into an addiction. These preliminary findings reveal the importance of supporting Moldovan and Ukrainian transnational families in renegotiating and re-forging relationships through technology channels to establish effective parent-child communication and improve the quality of parent-child relationships.

### **Relationship with Caregivers - From Intimate and Functional to Superficial and Conflictual**

According to preliminary findings of the research, caregiver-child relationships to a large extent improve out of necessity. However, there is an effort made to maintain the caregiving role of the parent, which is captured by a quote from a Ukrainian child: "Even if help is provided to a family with one or more parents abroad, there are things that only the away parent can do. It is unrealistic as you cannot replace a person." The quote indicates the tension that arises within transnational families actively working to preserve the role of parents. The findings thus far highlight that while caregivers provide a continuity of care, children in transnational families confront confusion and difficulty navigating either the maternal or paternal absence. This can be mitigated by compassionate caregivers that assume the caregiving role, establishing new bonds with the child whilst supporting the preservation of the emotional

bonds that anchor the parent-child relationship.

### **Youth Activities, Compensation Strategies and Support Groups**

Children in transnational families seek a sense of normalcy, belonging and mutual acceptance from their peers. A Moldovan child remarked: "Nothing changed with respect to friends, they encourage me and support me in my mother's departure... I discuss my mother's departure with classmates since they too have parents abroad. We try to help and encourage each other, support and help each other in our needs since we understand how difficult it is with no parents around." Overall, the preliminary findings of interviews highlighted the importance of peer groups in fostering belonging engendered through hobbies, sports and cultural events. While children remaining behind cannot compensate for a parent's absence, alternative attachments can be forged, which can build the child's self-esteem and lead to positive growth and development.

The CASTLE project will continue to conduct fieldwork to shed more light on the experiences of transnational families and, more specifically, children left behind in Ukraine and Moldova. For more information on the project, you can access the [project website](#) and [Info Note](#).





## Prague Process Migration Observatory: Newly released publications

### Policy Brief

*'Maximizing labour migration outcomes for countries of origin and destination'*

by Andrea Salvini and Georg Bolits.


Read in [English](#) or [Russian](#)

### Policy Brief

*'The war in Ukraine: Post-war scenarios and migration repercussions'*

by Franck Düvell.

Read in [English](#) or [Russian](#)



## Prague Process Country Factsheets:




Albania



Armenia



Azerbaijan



Belarus



Bosnia and Herzegovina



Bulgaria



Georgia



Kazakhstan



Kyrgyz Republic



Moldova



Romania



Russia



Tajikistan



Turkmenistan



Ukraine



Uzbekistan

## Reading recommendations

### ICMPD Expert Voice 'Europe's Ukrainian refugee crisis:

**What we know so far** by Hugo Brady

Read in [English](#), [Russian](#) or [Ukrainian](#).

### ICMPD Policy Insights Commentary 'The war in Ukraine and the renaissance of temporary protection - why this might be the only way to go'

by Martin Wagner

Read in [English](#), [Russian](#) or [Ukrainian](#).

### ICMPD Policy Insight Commentary 'Integration of Ukrainian refugees:

**The road ahead**' by Justyna Frelak and Caitlin Katsiaficas

Read in [English](#), [Russian](#) or [Ukrainian](#).

### ICMPD Commentary 'Getting Ukrainian refugees into work:

**The importance of early competence checks**' by Martin Hofmann

Read in [English](#), [Russian](#) or [Ukrainian](#)

### ICMPD Blog 'Are rural areas across Europe viable destinations for Ukrainian refugee women?'

by Bernhard Perchinig and Jimmy Perumadan

Read in [English](#), [Russian](#) or [Ukrainian](#)

### ICMPD Blog 'Could disruptions to Eastern European wheat spur displacement in Africa?'

by Veronika Bilger and Nesrine Ben Brahim

Read in [English](#), [Russian](#) or [Ukrainian](#)

**EUAA Country Intelligence Report: Russia as a Country of Origin.** Read in [English](#)

**In English: EUAA Asylum Report 2022.** Read in [English](#)

---

Editorial Team

**Alexander Maleev**, Project Manager, Prague Process Secretariat

**Irina Lysak**, Project Officer, Prague Process Secretariat

**Dariia Skovliuk**, Project Assistant, Prague Process Secretariat

## Contacts:

Prague Process Secretariat ICMPD HQ  
Gonzagagasse 1 | 1010 Vienna

pragueprocess@icmpd.org

Tel: +43 1 504 4677 0

Fax: +43 1 504 4677 - 2375